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The translation of statements from auctions to procurements is not always straightforward. We define a
duality relationship between them and provide the appropriate transformations needed for establishing it.
Additionally, we prove that affiliation is preserved under these transformations and establish the linkage
principle for procurements.
1. Introduction
The increasing use of procurements by governments and firms is
stimulating research with new and important questions. As a result,
more and more economists are studying procurements to understand its
properties in order to recommend the best practices. A natural research
strategy is to take as a starting point known results in the auction
literature. However, as we discuss below, a statement for auctions (where
bidders are buyers) is sometimes not readily translatable for procure
ments (where bidders are sellers). Since the received literature lacks a
simple method to make this translation, researchers in procurement must
invest some time in finding the correct parallel statement. The repetition
of this effort is obviously inefficient. The objective of this paper is to fill
this gap in the literature, by providing a general method to translate the
results from one environment to the other.
We motivate the difficulties one can encounter with two examples.
First, reverse hazard rate dominance of one distribution over the other
suffices to deliver a uniformly more aggressive bidding behavior in an
auction. In contrast, to deliver the same result in a procurement one
must appeal to hazard rate dominance. Second, if (auction) types are
affiliated, available results do not provide grounds for ensuring the
affiliation of the dual (procurement) types. It is hence unclear, for
instance, the status of the linkage principle for procurements.
We define a duality relationship between auctions and procure
ments and provide the appropriate transformations needed for
establishing it. The Duality Theorem then proves that an equilibrium
in one environment corresponds to an equilibrium in the other en
vironment. We conclude by illustrating with two applications how
to apply the duality result. Those two applications focus on the
aforementioned examples. The first one relates to comparative statics
on the distribution of types under the private values model. The
second one deals with the translation to procurements of the linkage
principle under the general affiliated model. To obtain this result, we
also generalize a theorem of Milgrom and Weber (1982) that may be
of importance by its own.
Finally, the importance of the Duality Theorem goes beyond auction
theory. Note that oligopolistic price competition under asymmetric
information is formally a variable quantity procurement in which the
lowest bidder wins the market and supplies the demanded output at the
winning price (see Spulber, 1995). One can hence appeal to the Duality
Theorem to get insights on oligopolistic competition models from the
auction competition models and vice versa.
2. Translation of procurements into auctions
Consider an auction game and a procurement game between n
players competing for one object. Assume, for simplicity, that both
processes are conducted under the sealed bid format,1 and that they
are standard in the sense that the best bid or offer determines the
winner. Our aim here is to show the duality between the two games.
To do so, we first describe the information and the payoff structure in
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1 Both the definitions that follow and the main result can be easily adapted to the
open format.
1
an auction environment, and then define transformations between
the auction and the procurement. The dual of O will be denoted O⁎
with O⁎⁎=O.
2.1. Information structure
Let (T,Υ,τ) denote the probabilistic space of types in an auction,
where T=Πi 1
n Ti. For simplicity, let us assume that each Ti is a compact
interval, that is, Ti=[ ti ,ti]⊂ℝ+. The vector of all types t=(ti,t−i) is
distributed according to a non atomic measure τ over Πi 1
n [ ti ,ti].
Let hi:Ti→Ti be a bijective function defined by hi(ti)=ti+ ti−ti.
Note that hi
−1=hi. Let h:T→T be given by h(t)=(h1(t1),…,hn(tn)).
The dual space of types is T⁎,Υ⁎,τ⁎, where (T⁎,Υ⁎)=(T,Υ) and τ⁎(A)=
τ(h−1(A)), with the caveat that the dual of type ti∈[ ti ,ti] is type
t⁎i ≡hiðtiÞ = t¯ i + t
¯
i−ti: ð1Þ
2.2. Payoff structure
An auction payoff structure is a quadruplet (vi,wi,li,Ui)i 1
n , where
for each buyer i, vi(t) represents the value she assigns to the object,
wi:B
n
→ℝ her payment when the profile of bids is b=(b,b− i)∈Bn and
she wins, li:B
n
→ℝ the payment when losing, and Ui:ℝ→ℝ represents
her utility. Thus, if buyers j≠ i follow strategies βj:Tj→B, buyer i has
type ti and bids bi above the reservation price r, then her interim
expected payoff will be
∫fUiðviðti; t iÞ−wiðb;β iðt iÞÞÞ1½b>maxj≠iβjðtjÞ$
Uið−liðb;β iðt iÞÞÞ1½b<maxj≠iβjðtjÞ$gτðdt i jtiÞ;
where τ(·|ti) is the conditional measure given ti.
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Denoted by v the highest value among bidders, v≡maxisuptvi(t).
Let the set of bids be B=[r,v]⊂ℝ+. For a given bid b∈B, the dual bid
is
b⁎≡ v¯ + r−b: ð2Þ
Note that B⁎=B.
Fix an auction payoff structure. Its dual (procurement) payoff
structure is (v i⁎,w i⁎,l i⁎,U i⁎)i 1
n , with3
v⁎i ðt
⁎
i ; t
⁎
iÞ = v¯ + r−viðti; t iÞ; ð3Þ
w⁎i ðb
⁎
i ; b
⁎
iÞ = v¯ + r−wiðbi; b iÞ; ð4Þ
l⁎i ðb
⁎
i ; b
⁎
iÞ = −liðbi; b iÞ; ð5Þ
U⁎i = Ui; ð6Þ
where tj= t j⁎⁎=(t j⁎)⁎ and bj=b j⁎⁎=(b j⁎)⁎ for each j.
If sellers j≠ i follow strategies β j⁎:T j⁎→B and seller i offers b⁎
below r then her interim expected payoff will be
∫fU⁎i ðw⁎i ðb⁎;β⁎ iðt⁎ iÞÞ−v⁎i ðt⁎i ; t⁎ iÞÞ1½b⁎<minj≠iβ⁎j ðt⁎j Þ$
U⁎i ðl
⁎
i ðb
⁎;β⁎ iðt
⁎
iÞÞÞ1½b⁎>minj≠iβ⁎j ðt
⁎
j
Þ$
gτ⁎ðdt⁎ i jt
⁎
i Þ;
where τ⁎(·|t i⁎) is the conditional measure given t i⁎ and β j⁎ is the dual
strategy of βj. Note that for each t and its dual t⁎, βi(ti)>maxj≠ iβj(tj)
iff β i⁎(t i⁎)>minj≠ iβ j⁎(t j⁎).
Definition 1. An auction environment is a profile A=((T,Υ,τ),(vi,wi,
li,Ui)i 1
n ) formed by the elements described above. Its dual envi
ronment is the profile P=A⁎=((T⁎,Υ⁎,τ⁎),(v i⁎,w i⁎,l i⁎,U i⁎)i 1
n ) and
it corresponds to a procurement environment.
The following example illustrates this definition:
Example 1. Consider a private values first price auction A with inde
pendent but asymmetric types given by
τ t∈
Yn
i 1
½ t i; t¯ i$ : ti ≤ xi;∀i
( ) !
=
Yn
i 1
GiðxiÞ;
viðti; t iÞ = ti;
wiðbi; b iÞ = bi;
liðbÞ = 0:
Then, the procurement P defined by the expressions below is its
dual:
τ⁎ t⁎∈
Yn
i 1
½ t
¯
i
⁎ ; t¯⁎i $ : t
⁎
i ≤xi;∀i
( ) !
=
Yn
i 1
FiðxiÞ;
v⁎i ðt
⁎
i ; t
⁎
iÞ = v¯ + r−ti;
w⁎i ðb
⁎
i ; b
⁎
iÞ = v¯ + r−bi;
l⁎i ðb
⁎
i ; b
⁎
iÞ = 0;
where Fi(xi)=1−Gi(ti+ t i−xi); ti= ti+ ti− t i⁎, and bi=v+r−b i⁎.
Notice that v i⁎(t i⁎,t⁎−i)=v+r+ t i⁎− ti− t i≠ t i⁎, unless v+r= ti+ t i.
The following is the heart of our contribution:
Theorem 1 (Duality Theorem). The auction environment A=((T,Υ,
τ),(vi,wi,li,Ui)i 1
n ) and its dual P=((T⁎,Υ⁎,τ⁎),(vi⁎,wi⁎,l i⁎,U i⁎)i 1
n ) are
strategically equivalent games.
More formally, if players in A follow the strategy profile β=(β1,…,
βn) and players in P follow the dual strategy profile β⁎=(β1⁎,…,βn⁎),
then their (ex ante, interim, ex post) payoffs will be exactly the same.
Thus, β is an equilibrium of A iff its dual β⁎ is an equilibrium of P.
Proof. The ex post payoff of player i in A is:
Uiðviðti; t iÞ−wiðβiðtiÞ;β iðt iÞÞÞ1½βiðtiÞ>maxj≠iβjðtjÞ$
+ Uið−liðβiðtiÞ;β iðt iÞÞÞ1½βiðtiÞ<maxj≠iβjðtjÞ$;
while in P is:
U⁎i w
⁎
i β
⁎
i t
⁎
i
% &
;β⁎ i t
⁎
i
% &% &
−v⁎i t⁎i ; t⁎ i
% &% &
1
β⁎
i
t⁎
i
' (
<min
j≠iβ
⁎
j
t⁎
j
% &h i
+ U⁎i l
⁎
i β
⁎
i t
⁎
i
% &
;β⁎ i t
⁎
i
% &% &% &
1
β⁎
i
t⁎
i
' (
>min
j≠iβ
⁎
j
t⁎
j
% &h i
:
Substituting β i⁎(t i⁎) by v̄+ r−βi(ti), it follows that that the event
[βi(ti)>maxj≠ iβj(tj)] is equal to the event [β i⁎(t i⁎)<minj≠ iβ j⁎(t j⁎)].
The same holds true for events [βi(ti)<maxj≠ iβj(tj)] and [β i⁎(t i⁎)>
minj≠ iβ j⁎(t j⁎)]. Furthermore, U i⁎(l i⁎(β i⁎(t i⁎),β− i⁎ (t−i⁎ )))=Ui(li(βi(ti),
β− i(t−i))) and
Uiðviðti; t iÞ−wiðβiðtiÞ;β iðt iÞÞÞ
= U⁎i ð v¯ + r−v⁎i ðt⁎i ; t⁎ iÞ− v¯−r + w⁎i ðβ⁎i ðt⁎i Þ;β⁎ iðt⁎i ÞÞÞ
= U⁎i ðw
⁎
i ðβ
⁎
i ðt
⁎
i Þ;β
⁎
iðt
⁎
iÞÞ−v⁎i ðt⁎i ; t⁎ iÞÞ:
Since ex post payoffs are equal, the statement follows.
2 We ignore what happens in a tie for simplicity and because ties occur with zero
probability in many auction games.
3 There are other alternative dual expressions. It is sufficient, for instance, that the
duality of types and bids satisfy tj= tj⁎⁎=(tj⁎) ⁎ and bj=bj⁎⁎=(bj⁎)⁎ and that Eqs. (3)
and (4) hold for some L in the place of v+ r.
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3. Application to stochastic orders
Existing work on comparative statics for first price auctions has
shown that a stochastically higher distribution of values (in the sense
of the reverse hazard rate order) leads to uniformly more aggressive
bidding (see Lebrun (1998) and Maskin and Riley (2000)). We first
show how these results translate to procurement games by appealing
to the Duality Theorem.
Proposition 1. If Fi hazard rate dominates Fj
fi
1 Fi
<
fj
1 Fj
+ ,
then for all
b∈( b, b ) we have:
i) (β i⁎)
−1(b)>(β j⁎)
−1(b), and
ii) Fi((β i⁎)
−1(b))<Fj((β j⁎)
−1(b)).
Proof. By Example (1), the dual of the procurement game is an
auction with distribution of types G1,G2 such that Gi(x)≡1−Fi(ti−x).
Hazard rate dominance of Fi over Fj implies reverse hazard rate
dominance of Gj over Gi. Thus, Propositions 3.3 and 3.5 in Maskin and
Riley (2000) deliver the comparative statics above. □
It is worth mentioning that Pesendorfer (2000) shows the above
result by analyzing the system of differential equations that determine
the equilibrium inverse bidding functions. The current proof illustrates
the usefulness of the Duality Theorem.
Proposition 2. Consider a competitive procurement and let β1⁎, β2⁎ be
the equilibrium bid functions when cost distributions are (F1,F2) and let
β̃1⁎, β̃2⁎ be the equilibrium bid functions when cost distributions are (F1,F̃2)
If F̃2 hazard rate dominates F2, then for all b⁎∈( b, b ) we have:
i) β̃1⁎(t⁎)>β1⁎(t⁎), and
ii) F̃2((β̃2⁎)
−1(b⁎))<F2((β̃2⁎)
−1(b⁎)).
Proof. Theorem 1 in Lebrun (1998) and Theorem 1 deliver the
result. □
Propositions 1 and 2 show that the conditions on the primitives
to have a uniformly more aggressive bidding behavior are different
in auctions and in procurements. In the former, reverse hazard rate
dominance of one distribution over the other suffices, whereas the
latter one must appeal to hazard rate dominance.
More recently, the impact of a less dispersed distribution of types on
auction bidding has been analyzed by Hopkins and Kornienko (2007).
From their comparative statics results and the Duality Theorem, the effects
of more precise information on procurement bidding is next obtained.
Proposition 3. Consider a competitive procurement. If fi / fj is unimodal
and Ei[t]≥Ej[t], then βi⁎(t⁎)>βj⁎(t⁎) on ( t, t̂H] where t̂H is the maximum
on [ t,t] of the probability ratio (1−F1)/(1−F2).
Further, if t̂H< t then βi⁎(t⁎) can cross βj⁎(t⁎) once and from above
on (t̂H, t ).
4. Application to the linkage principle and revenue ranking
The linkage principle is an important result in auction theory,
which allows to show that the second price auction yields higher
revenue than the first price auction if types are affiliated (see Krishna,
2002). Does it hence follow that the “second price procurement” is
preferable over the “first price procurement”? If the second price
auction is the one that gives higher payments, an auctioneer might
actually prefer the first price procurement as she is the one making
the payments in a procurement. It is even reasonable to doubt the
validity of the principle itself, as the affiliation inequality for procure
ments is the same as for auctions, but the best type is the lowest type
rather than the highest type. Therefore, inequalities may not even
have the direction necessary to produce a proof. To make things even
more dubious, the received literature does not ensure that affiliation is
preserved under decreasing transformations, as needed to translate
types from auctions to procurement.4 In sum, it is not clear at all the
status of the linkage principle for procurements. This section clarifies
this issue.
We begin by extending Milgrom and Weber (1982)'s Theorem 3
for non increasing transformations, proving that affiliation is pre
served under the duality maps.
Theorem 2. Assume that X1,…,Xn are affiliated. If g1,…gn are all non
decreasing or are all non increasing functions fromℝ toℝ then g1(X1),…
gn(Xn) are affiliated.
Proof. Using Theorem 3 of Milgrom and Weber (1982), it is sufficient
to argue that if X1,…,Xn are affiliated, then −X1,…,−Xn are also
affiliated, since g1,…,gn are all non increasing if and only if g1 ○ s,…,
gn ○s are all non decreasing, where s(x)=−x.
In the particular case in which there is a density function f:
ℝ
n
→ℝ+, affiliation is equivalent to f(x)f(y)⩽ f(x⋀y)f(x⋁y). Since
−(x⋀y)=(−x)⋁(−y) and −(x⋁y)=(−x)⋀(−y), affiliation of f
is then equivalent to affiliation of f ̂:ℝn→ℝ+, where f ̂(x)=(f ○ s)(x)=
f(−x), as f(−x)f(−y)⩽ f((−x)⋀(−y))f((−x)⋁(−y)).
For the general case, we say that a set A⊂ℝn is increasing if its
indicator function 1A is non decreasing in the usual partial order of
ℝ
n. A set S⊂ℝn is a sublattice if x⋀y∈S and x⋁y∈S for all x,y∈S. For
a vector of random variables X=(X1,…,Xn) write P(A) for Pr(X∈A)
and P(−A) for Pr(−X∈A)=Pr(X∈−A). X is affiliated iff P(AB|S)⩾
P(A|S)P(B|S), for all increasing sets A, B and sublattice S, where Ac=
ℝ
n \A.
We want to prove that X affiliated implies −X affiliated, that is,
Prð−X∈A∩B jSÞ = Pðð−AÞð−BÞ jSÞ⩾Pð−A jSÞPð−B jSÞ;
for all increasing sets A, B and sublattice S. Fix A and B increasing
sets. Then, (−A)c and (−B)c are also increasing. Thus, P(−A|S)=1−
P((−A)c|S) and P(−B/S)=1−P((B)c|S), which implies:
Pð−A jSÞPð−B jSÞ = 1−Pðð−AÞc jSÞ−Pðð−BÞc jSÞ + Pðð−AÞc jSÞPðð−BÞc jSÞ:
Similarly, P((−A)(−B)|S)=1−P((−A)c|S)−P((−B)c|S))+P((−A)c)
(−B)c|S). Thus, P((−A)(−B)|S)⩾P(−A|S)P(−B|S), iff
Pðð−AÞc∩ð−BÞc jSÞ⩾Pðð−AÞc jSÞPðð−BÞc jSÞ;
but since (−A)c and (−B)c are increasing sets, this last equation is true
because X is affiliated. □
The reader should note that the above theorem would be false if
we request the functions gi to be merely monotonic.
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We can now apply the Duality Theorem to obtain easily a linkage
principle for procurements:
Theorem 3. Assume that the bidders are symmetric, risk neutral, have
affiliated types, and that the same reserve price is used in both a first price
and in a second price procurement. If the players play the symmetric
equilibrium, then the auctioneer prefers the second price over the first
price procurement.
Proof. It is well known that E[wI(ti,t−i)]≤E[wII(ti,t−i)], where wI(ti,t−i)
and wII(ti,t−i) denote, respectively, the symmetric payments in the first
and in the second price auctions. By Eq. (4), this implies that in the dual
procurement, E[wI⁎(ti,t−i)]≥E[wII⁎(ti,t−i)]. Since E[wP⁎(ti,t−i)] is the
expected payment that the auctioneer has to make in the procurement
P=I,II, then she prefers the second price mechanism. □
4 Milgrom and Weber (1982)'s Theorem 3 states that: if g1,…,gn are non-decreasing
functions from ℝ to ℝ and X1,…Xn are affiliated then g1(X1),…,gn(Xn) are affiliated.
5 If g1 is increasing and g2 is decreasing, the inequalities that guarantee that X1 and
X2 are affiliated will be the opposite to the ones guaranteeing that g(X1) and g(X2) are.
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